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The National Emergencies Act of 1976-
End of Emergency Government?
GEORGE SLATER
INTRODUCTION
National emergencies, like small wars in distant countries, are easier to get
into than they are to escape. Unlike wars, however, the "temporary" powers which
national emergencies invoke gradually insinuate themselves into the day-to-day
operation of the government where they are largely safe from public and Con-
gressional scrutiny. These emergency powers give the executive extraordinary
authority, which if made permanent, would clearly be repugnant to the Constitution.
Today we live under four presidentially proclaimed states of national emergency.'
In response to the numerous bank failures during the Great Depression (1933),
President Roosevelt declared a state of national emergency. In the face of
'communist aggression" in Korea (1950), President Truman declared a national
emergency. President Nixon reacted to a strike by U.S. postal workers (1970)
and to a large balance of payments deficit in overseas trade (1971) by declaring
states of national emergency. None of these proclamations have ever been
terminated.2
In each case the President proclaimed a state of national emergency in order
to trigger special statutory authority meant for use by the executive branch in
a time of national crisis. For example, government agencies must normally
advertise their intention to procure property or services. Competitive bids are
then received and the lowest bid is accepted. Special legislation provides, how-
ever, that the agency will have authority to negotiate purchases without
advertising during a national emergency.3 Another law provides that price
ceilings which normally limit the amount a government agency may spend to
lease property are lifted during a national emergency.4 Another statute suspends
normal limitations on the number of military officers in the Armed Services
during a national emergency.5 In total, there exist today some 470 provisions of
federal law which give the executive branch extraordinary authority in time of a
national emergency.6
The problem is that although the various crisis situations which have given
rise to declarations of national emergency have passed, a legal state of national
emergency remains. This means that the executive branch has available, on a
daily basis, the authority of some 470 separate statutes meant only to be
available in time of actual emergency conditions. It has been said that, "This
vast range of powers, taken together, confer enough authority to rule the
country without reference to normal constitutional processes."' This refers to
the fact that by using all of the emergency statutes on a daily basis, the
executive branch could rule the country without consulting Congress, thus
upsetting the checks and balances that are an integral part of our constitutional
system. Thomas Jefferson recognized that "the way to have a good and safe
government, is not to trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many." In
answer to his own question, "What has destroyed liberty and rights of man in
every government which has ever existed under the sun?", he replied, "the
generalizing and concentrating of all cares and powers into one body."8 The
Special Senate Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency
Powers, whose history will be discussed, concluded that they could not "accept
any doctrine which holds that a nation in extremis must submit to the will of a
single individual." 9
The executive branch's use of national emergency power on a continuous
basis is not just a theoretical concern, but is an everyday fact of life. Many
departments of the executive branch continue to use national emergency
authority in their everyday operations relying on the fact that past declarations
of national emergency have never been formally terminated. As will be
demonstrated, our court system has readily affirmed the agencies' use of such
authority by refusing to "look behind" a declaration of national emergency
to see if, in reality, one exists. In other words, the courts have not been
willing to second guess the executive branch's evaluation that a national
emergency declared years ago still exists. Thus, the state of national emergency
existing today is a fiction allowed to continue by the executive branch in order
to utilize the various national emergency powers available to it by statute, and
the fiction has been upheld by the courts.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's several members of Congress became
increasingly concerned that the President was thwarting the legislative intent of
Congress by allowing the executive branch to continue to use emergency
authority long after the conditions which prompted the declarations of
emergency had disappeared.' 0
The legislators were trying to face the fact that,
The 2,000 year old problem of how a legislative body in a democratic
republic may extend extraordinary powers for use by the executive
during times of great crisis and dire emergency - but do so in ways
assuring both that such necessary powers will be terminated
immediately when the emergency has ended and that normal processes
will be resumed - has not yet been resolved in this country."
The National Emergencies Act of 1976 is a congressional attempt to insure
that the executive branch's exercise of national emergency authority is
"responsible, appropriate, and timely."' 2 The National Emergencies Act is
divided into five titles. Title One terminates on September 14, 1978 most
Executive authority which is based on past proclamations of national
emergency.'3 The Act does not terminate the old proclamations themselves, but
instead revokes the statutory authority invoked by the past proclamations.
Since the only Executive authority that is revoked is that which is based upon
past proclamations of national emergency, the statutory authority remains
available to the President whenever he proclaims a new national emergency.
To illustrate, one statute permits the President, during a war or national
emergency, and upon the application of any country, to detail members of the
armed forces to assist that country in military matters. 14 The President
presently has this authority available to him since the United States is still in a
legal state of national emergency as a result of the unterminated proclamations.
After September 14, 1978, the effective date of the National Emergencies Act,
this authority will only be available to the President upon a new proclamation
of war or national emergency.
Titles Two,' 5 Three,' 6 and Four' 7 of the Act institute specific procedures
to be followed after the declaration of any future national emergency. Title
Five" excepts certain national emergency power statutes from the effect of the
National Emergencies Act.
The purpose of this article is to examine whether the National Emergencies
Act will accomplish its purpose of insuring that the exercise of national
emergency authority by the Executive is responsible, appropriate, and timely.
While the National Emergencies Act has drawn a certain amount of attention to
the problem, it has, by no means, solved it. The Act exempts from its provisions
eight statutes which the executive branch considers "vital" national emergency
authority.' 9 The obvious paradox of these exceptions, which is one of the most
important continuing problems in the area, is more easily understood after an
examination of how the National Emergencies Act came to be law.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress finally came to grips with the problems of ending our current
national emergencies after a long period of neglect. It is true that the primary
responsibility for ending presidentially declared emergencies lies with the
President; but Congress' refusal to fact the consequences of failure by the
Executive to administer this responsibility has contributed significantly to the
current chaos. The story of the development and passage of the National
Emergencies Act of 1976 illustrates the continuing problems of dealing with this
long neglected area.
The American experience in Vietnam seemed to focus Congressional
attention on the national emergency power problem, as Senator Charles Mathias
testified:
My own interest in the question of emergency powers developed out of
our experience in the Vietnam War and the incursion into Cambodia. It
became clear that the President had powers to commit us to warfare
without adequate respect for the constitutional requirement that
Congress alone can declare a state of war.20
In 1972 the Senate formed a new committee, The Special Committee on the
Termination of the National Emergency, to consider what problems might arise
as a result of terminating the only national emergency known at that time to the
Senate to be in existence (the 1950 Korean proclamation). The committee was
empowered "to conduct a study and investigation with respect to the termination
of the 1950 emergency, to consider problems which might arise as the result of
the termination and to consider what administrative or legislative actions mightbe necessary." 2 The name of the Special Committee on the Termination of the
National Emergency was subsequently changed to the Special Committee on
National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers (hereinafter called the
Special Committee) when it was learned that not one but four national
emergencies remained unterminated. The Special Committee was unusual in
that it was to be completely bipartisan in nature and, in fact, consisted of four
Democrats and four Republicans. Senator Mathias explained,
The Committee's bipartisan nature reflects the intention of the Senate
to examine emergency powers legislation solely from a constitutional
perspective. We want to determine how these powers affect the proper
relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches.22
The Special Committee was limited in that it could not report a bill directly to
the floor of the Senate but could only recommend action.
The Special Committee began its inquiry by compiling a list of all statutes
that gave the Executive special authority in time of national emergency.23 No
complete list existed prior to that time which meant that the Special Committee's
staff had to devise computer programs to search the United States Code for key
words such as national emergency, war, national defense, invasion, insurrection,
etc. The computer lists then had to be hand checked for accuracy. Until the task
was complete, not only did the Congress not have a complete listing of the
emergency power delegated to the Executive, but the Executive did not have a
complete listing of the emergency power available to it! Senator Church called
the compilation one of the Special Committee's proudest accomplishments.24
During the hearings which the Special Committee conducted, a number of
constitutional scholars were asked to testify. Much of the testimony confirmed
the importance of the inquiry at hand. Dr. Robert S. Rankin, Professor Emeritus
of Duke University, warned of the growth in the use of emergency power. He
commented on the growth in the last twnety years of "an almost impassioned
devotion in the United States to constitutional rights," but then noted the
proliferation of international and domestic crises and added, "This strong
devotion to constitutional rights has not prevented the use of emergency power to
a degree that would shock many of our constitutional fathers." 25 The point is that
emergency power placed with the President in order that he may be prepared to
preserve and protect society in time of crisis is at odds with the constitutional
rights of the people and the civilian control of government, which antagonistic
functions are both essential characteristics of a durable democratic society.
Dr. Rankin's conclusion was that emergency powers are necessary but must be
carefully controlled. He testified, "I think of emergency power as in the same
category as morphine. Used properly and within bounds set up by the Constitution
it becomes restorative in nature and has a proper place within a democracy. Used
improperly it is the very essense of tyranny."2 6
Dr. Gerhard Casper, Professor of Law and Political Science at the University
of Chicago, added historical insight to the Senate hearings by noting the
experience of the post-World War I German government whose executive
branch used emergency powers with such frequency as to destroy democracy as
as we know it. He pointed out that "Under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution,
the President had the authority to take emergency measures when public safety
and order were endangered. What constitutional lawyers of the Weimar era called
with admirable frankness, 'the directorial powers' of the President, were invoked
approximately 136 times between 1919 and 1925."27
No one knows exactly how often our Presidents have acted pursuant to
emergency power statutes.28 The Special Committee did compile a list of
Executive Orders in Times of War and National Emergency but admits that
"there is, regrettably no way of being certain that this compilation contains all
Executive Orders still in effect issued pursuant to emergency power statutes."2 9
Late in 1973 the Special Committee sent out a form letter30 requesting that
each Executive department that had been delegated emergency statutory
authority evaluate the impact of terminating such authority until a future
emergency arose. The Special Committee was surprised to find that several
agencies' day-to-day operations rested in part on a legal foundation of emergency
authority. 3 ' Nevertheless, the Special Committee's plan to phase out national
emergencx authority still seemed reasonable. The effective date of the National
Emergencies Act was to be one year (later changed to two) from the date of its
enactment; a grace period was being given the agencies - time in which to seek
permanent legislation replacing the emergency authority. The agencies,
however, are well acquainted with the extra discretion and flexibility emergency
power gives them and appear to be very hesitant to give it up or to submit these
powers to Congressional review. Throughout the balance of the life of the Special
Committee, various agencies argued for exceptions from the proposed legislation,
and eight exceptions were finally agreed upon. Senator Church said,
[Wie wrote these exceptions into the law with very considerable
misgivings.
But in order to reach an accommodation that would permit unanimous
action in the Senate and give the promise of a Presidential signature, we
did make these exceptions. They thought these particular laws were so
vital, they didn't want them placed in a questionable status. 32
On August 22, 1974 after considering the information gathered in the hearings
and the replies from the various executive departments, the Special Committee
issued an interim report of findings and recommendation saying, in part, "In our
view, Congress should provide statutory guidelines to assure the full operation of
constitutional processes in time of war or emergency. This is the best prescription
to avoid any future exercise of arbitrary authoritarian power."" It recommended
legislation "to terminate certain authorities with respect to national emergencies
still in effect, and to provide for orderly implementation and termination of future
national emergencies." 34 The bill was introduced in the Senate and referred to the
Committee on Government Operations. It was finally adopted with amendments
on October 7, 1974. The most significant amendment was the exemption of six
statutes from the provisions of the bill. Although a version of the Special
Committee's recommended legislation was introduced in the House and referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary, it was not considered because of other
pressing business, mainly the impeachment of Richard Nixon and the nomination
of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President. Thus, the proposed legislation failed to
pass both Houses before the adjournment of the 93rd Congress.3
With the convening of the 94th Congress, the same proposal was reintroduced
into both Houses of Congress, but, again, more pressing business slowed down
consideration of the measure. Although the impeachment inquiry had ended
with President Nixon's resignation in August 1974, a new "flap" was developing
over revelations of improper activities in the FBI and CIA. In January, 1975, the
Senate established a new committee to " . . conduct an investigation and study
of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities." 3 6 Senator
Frank Church, the Special Committee's co-chairman, was named chairman of
this committee and he promptly asked the Staff Director of the Special Committee
to become the Staff Director of the new Senate committee. As a result it was over
a year before the Special Committee was able to issue its final report. In March,
1975, an entirely new staff of the Special Committee was faced with the task of
completing work on the legislation. During the same month the House Sub-
committee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee
on the Judiciary held hearings and the measure was again amended.37 The one
year grace period, which was designed to give executive agencies a chance to
seek permanent law to replace expiring emergency authority, was extended to
two years, and additions were made to the list of exemptions from the provisions
of the proposed law. The bill was finally adopted by the House on September 4,
1975, and sent to the Senate where it was referred to the Committee on
Government Operations. Meanwhile, the final report of the Special Committee
was issued urging passage of the National Emergencies Act and concluding that,
[L]egislation is long overdue. A majority of Americans alive today have
lived their entire lives under emergency rule. Since 1933, protections and
procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees,
been abridged by Executive directives whose legality rests on the
continued existence of Presidentially proclaimed states of emergency.38
The Committee on Government Operations reported the National Emergencies
Act with "one substantial and several technical amendments," deciding that a
definition of national emergency should not be included in the bill.
The Committee decided that the definition of when a President is
authorized to declare a national emergency should be left to the various
statutes which give him extraordinary powers. The National Emergencies
Act is not intended to enlarge or add to Executive power. Rather the
statute is an effort by the Congress to establish clear procedures and
safeguards upon him by other statutes.39
President Ford signed the bill into law on September 14, 1976, stating that
although he "supported the purposes of the enrolled bill" that one of its
provisions, which provided that Congress could terminate a presidentially
declared national emergency, was "clearly unconstitutional" and said that he
considers that provision separable from the rest of the bill in the event the courts
strike down this type of "legislative encroachment" measure. 40
THE EFFORT TO MAKE THE EXECUTIVE'S
USE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWER
RESPONSIBLE, APPROPRIATE, AND TIMELY
A major goal of the National Emergencies Act was to make the executive
branch of government more responsible to Congress when using emergency
statutory authority. The legislation was designed to stop "open ended" grants of
power to the Executive by terminating the powers available as a result of past
declarations of national emergency and to provide statutory guidelines to govern
future declarations. It was felt that if Congress provided statutory guidelines to
govern future declarations of national emergency, the President would feel
obliged to follow them. At least he would be less likely to act on his own without
consulting Congress.
The Special Committee used, as a basic guideline for its work, Justice
Jackson's opinion in the famous 1952 case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v
Sawyer, 41 in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional President Truman's
attempt to seize control of the striking steel industry. Justice Jackson rejected
the notion that a President has "inherent" powers apart from those given him
in the Constitution or delegated to him by Congress - even to meet a crisis
situation. He said, "such power either has no beginning or it has no end. If it
exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that it would plunge
us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong direction."4 2
Regarding statutory guidelines he stated:
In the practical working of our Government we already have evolved a
technique within the framework of the Constitution by which normal
executive powers may be considerably expanded to meet an emergency.
Congress may and has granted extraordinary authorities which lie
dormant in normal times but may be called into play by the Executive
in war or upon proclamation of a national emergency.
. . . Under this procedure we retain Government by law - special,
temporary law, but law nonetheless.43
Former Chief Justice Warren, when counseling the Special Committee, agreed
with Justice Jackson's view that where there are statutory guidelines, a President
is obliged to follow the precepts contained in the laws passed by Congress and
cautioned that inherent powers problems arise when Congress fails to act
definitely.44
It is important to bear in mind that the Special Committee was concerned
with Congress's overdelegation of open ended emergency authority to the
Executive, but was not concerned with any express or implied powers given the
President by the Constitution. Senator Church stated that "we were principally
concerned in establishing statutory procedures to govern future emergencies
that would insure Congress the proper legislative role." 4 5
Section 101 of the National Emergencies Act seeks to stop open ended grants
of authority to the Executive by declaring that "all powers and authorities
possessed by the President, any other officer or employee of the Federal
Government, or any executive agency ... as a result of the existence of any
declaration of national emergency in effect on the date of enactment of this Act
are terminated two years from the date of such enactment."46 (The date of
enactment was September 14, 1976, so the powers and authorities will
terminate on September 14, 1978.) The states of national emergency them-
selves are not terminated hut only the authority possessed by the Executive as a
result of past declarations of national emergency. Further, most of the statutes
remain 'on the books" and available to the Executive when a future national
emergency is declared.
The Special Committee could have recommended legislation directly
terminating the four existing states of national emergency. In fact, this was the
inclination of some members.47 However, they believed that such legislation
would raise a serious constitutional question of whether the separation of powers
doctrine would permit a legislative termination of the Executive declarations."
The Special Committee could also have recommended legislation repealing
all emergency statutes. The outright repeal of all emergency statutes was
discarded because the Committee did not intend to deprive the President of the
power necessary to cope with an emergency but only to insure that such
declarations be subject to Congressional review.49
The Special Committee chose the third alternative - to relegate most of the
emergency power statutes to a state of dormancy. Senator Church said, "The
statutes conferring emergency powers remain on the shelf, to be pulled off and
used as may be required to deal with some future crisis. But procedures
governing the use of emergency powers in the future will always be subject to
Congressional review.50 Senator Mathias explained that "While the statutes
would go into a state of dormancy . . . , these emergency powers are available
to be used upon proclamation of need by the President to meet any future
emergency." 5 '
The National Emergencies Act sets forth specific guidelines for the President
when he declares a future national emergency. The declaration must be
transmitted to Congress and published in the Federal Register. Section 201
states, "With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the
period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President
is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall
immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal
Register."5 In addition to the reporting requirement just mentioned, the
President is now required to keep records. Section 401 states that "the President
shall be responsible for maintaining a file and index of all significant orders." 53
He must also keep a record of related expenditures. Section 401(c) states that
When the President declares a national emergency or Congress
declares war, the President shall transmit to Congress, within ninety
days after the end of each six-month period after such declaration, a
report on the total expenditures incurred by the United States
Government during such six-month period which are directly attributable
to the exercise of powers and authorities conferred by such declaration.54
Two major obstacles remain in the effort to make the Executive branch
more accountable in their use of national emergency power. The National
Emergencies Act did not attempt to solve either. First, the classification of
sensitive or important Executive decisions as ''confidential," "secret," "top
secret," etc. prevents Congressional oversight in most cases. A Special
Committee report stated that "While no one would wish to prevent sensitive
documents from being classified for reasonable cause, the absolute discretion
given to the Executive has led to abuse. It has permitted and encouraged
inclusion in this category of many documents in no way connected with essential
national security."5 5
The situation is complicated by the fact that besides Executive Orders,
Presidents have used proclamations, letters, memorandums, directives, notices,
reorganization plans, administrative designation, and military orders to give
effect to their wishes. If the document is not officially designated as an
Executive Order or proclamation, the decision of whether or not it will be
published is left to the President.56 Senator Church summed up the problem
well when he said,
Again, Congress' complacency can be cited as the reason for this
disorderly state of affairs. Congress has not specified substantive
standards under which all - and I emphasize all - presidential directiVes
should be recorded. In addition, Congress has not yet enacted laws to
prevent the Executive branch from abusing its power to classify
documents where its purpose is to withhold from Congress and the
public. The problem of public accountability is unfortunately wrapped
in legal controversy and is, in a sense, technical in nature. It involves,
however, in a profound sense, the survival of constitutional
government.57
The second major obstacle to achieving Executive responsibility in the use of
national emergency power is the difficulty with finding an effective definition
of "national emergency." Webster's dictionary defines "emergency" as a
'sudden, generally unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances demanding
immediate action." 58 Professor Edward Corwin explains emergency conditions
as those which have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of
their being dealt with according to rule.5 9 In reacting to crises, "distressed"
emergencies, "intensified" emergencies, "acute" emergencies, "unprecedented"
emergencies, and "unlimited" emergencies have been declared. 60 The point is
that in order to avoid the accountability requirements of the National Emergencies
Act, the President may just avoid the trigger word "national emergency" when
confronted with a crisis situation. In its final report, the Special Committee
warned that Congress must be prepared for possible efforts to thwart the intent
of the bill by dropping the wording "national emergency" and introducing
different terminology. 6'
The National Emergencies Act attempts to make the Executive's use of
delegated emergency power not only responsible but also appropriate. The
legislation is intended to insure that the Executive will only use the appropriate
national emergency authority to confront the crisis at hand. An example will
demonstrate that this has not always been the case.
During the Civil War, Congress passed the Feed and Forage Act of
1861 to enable the cavalry in the American West to buy feed for their
horses when Congress was out of session. Later, Presidents invoked the
authority of this Act . to finance American marines in Lebanon in
1958, to support the Berlin mobilization in 1962, and to maintain troops
in Southeast Asia. 62
The President chose not to declare a national emergency during the Vietnam
WVar. There was no need to. He simply relied on the 1950 Korean declaration to
trigger any emergency authority he decided to utilize, as the following example
shows:
In 1950, Congress passed the Defense Production Act giving the
President wide ranging powers to control the production of materials
needed for national defense efforts connected with the Korean War.
Sixteen years later, the Act was used to fill a Department of Defense
order for 3 million tropical uniforms for use in Vietnam. In the fourth
quarter of 1966, the President also relied on the law to require steel,
copper, and aluminum producers to set aside part of their output for
defense purposes.63
In order to encourage the Executive to use only the appropriate national
emergency authority, section 301 of the National Emergencies Act specifies
that "no powers or authorities made available by statute for use in the event of
an emergency shall be exercised unless and until the President specifies the
provisions of law under which he, . . . or other officers will act." 64 The
specification must be made in the declaration itself or in a subsequent Executive
Order published in the Federal Register and transmitted to Congress.
The National Emergencies Act is also designed to make the Executive's use
of national emergency authority timely. The concept of timeliness blends in
somewhat with the companion goals of responsibility and appropriateness, but
emphasizes the timing of the declaration and termination of the national
emergency.
The legislation was not intended to inhibit in any substantive way the
President's ability to declare a national emergency.65 During debates on the
measure in the House, an amendment was offered which would have limited
the conditions under which the President could declare a national emergency,
but that proposal was quickly rejected. 66 It was felt that the President needed
the "flexibility" to declare a national emergency whenever he deemed it
appropriate.
Section 202 of the National Emergencies Act, however, provides that Congress
can terminate the emergency by concurrent resolution.67 The ability to
terminate a presidentially declared national emergency acts as a check on the
Executive's untimely use of national emergency power. During House debate on
the bill, Representative Moorehead commented on this provision:
[I]t is important that we give our President some flexibility from time
to time. This bill gives the Congress the right to wipe out those
emergencies on a moment's notice if we decide it is in the best interest
to do so. But let us at least leave the President the constitutional
authority he has to protect this country in times of need.68
And, as pointed out earlier, this termination by concurrent resolution option of
the Congress was the provision President Ford called "unconstitutional" when
he signed the bill into law. 6 9
THE EIGHT EXCEPTIONS
The National Emergencies Act exempts from its provisions eight emergency
power statutes considered by the Executive to be vital to the operation of
government.Ao By allowing the eight exceptions, Congress expressly approved
of the Executive's continued use of the emergency authority contained in those
eight statutes. One might ask why the Congress, while trying to pass legislation
to end emergency government would allow eight exceptions to the legislation
which have the effect of continuing emergency government in the United States.
Senator Mathias explained:
The ones that are excepted, or the ones that were particularly requested
by the President to be excepted because he felt they were so vital to the
operation of Government at this time that he didnit want to take a chance
that they might not be extended or revised during the 1-year [later
change to two] grace period. 7 '
It is not difficult to understand why the President and the various executive
agencies would argue that the exceptions were vital to the operation of
government. The Executive branch is well acquainted with the extra discretion
and flexibility that accompanies national emergency authority. In fact, that is
the whole idea behind Congress delegating emergency authority to the Executive.
Realizing that the Congress, with its many members, tends to react more slowly
to a given situation than the President, temporary extraordinary power is
delegated to the Executive who is in a better position to use it more swiftly and
decisively in meeting a crisis situation. This is hardly new theory. John Locke, the
English political philosopher, supported this practice in his Second Treatise on
Civil Government when he argued that the threat of a crisis, unforeseen, sudden,
and potentially catastrophic, required the creation of broad emergency powers
that
should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power
since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being
and is usually too numerous, and too slow for the dispatch requisite to
executions " 72
What is not so easy to understand is why the Congress swallowed the
Executive's argument. Was not the goal of the National Emergencies Act to end
the Executive's day-to-day use of national emergency power? It seems that every
exception granted had the effect of directly thwarting this overall legislative
purpose. Remember that the National Emergencies Act does not terminate the
national emergencies themselves. It only terminates the Executive authority
gained by past declarations of national emergency. Thus, the past declarations
are still in effect to trigger the authority contained in the eight exceptions.
Are these eight statutes really so vital to the operation of government that
they could not have been placed "on the shelf" with the others? The two-year
grace period would have permitted the executive agencies time to seek permanent
law replacing the emergency authority. By not allowing any exceptions to the
National Emergencies Act, Congress would have forced a review of all the
Executive's actions which are currently based upon a legal fiction of national
emergency.
Evidently, the sponsors of the legislation felt that they had to compromise
their position or risk failure to get the legislation signed into law.
We wrote these exceptions into the law with very considerable misgivings
... But in order to reach an accommodation that would permit unanimous
action in the Senate and give the promise of a Presidential signature, we
did make these exceptions. They thought these particular laws were so
vital, they didn't want them placed in a questionable status.73
An examination of the exempted statutes,7 i.e., those which give the Executive
continuing national emergency power, is enlightening. The reader may draw his
or her own conclusions on how vital the authority is to the everyday operation
of our government.
One of the most significant exceptions from the provisions of the National
Emergencies Act is the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended,7
which is a lengthy statute that during its greater than sixty years of existence has
provided the President with, in the words of a House subcommittee,
progressively broader authority to regulate the nation's international
(and domestic) finance during periods of declared national emergency.
This section has been construed over the years as providing statutory
authority for "emergency" actions as diverse as the "bank holiday" of
1933, an alien property freeze and consumer credit controls imposed
during World War II, foreign direct investment controls imposed in 1968,
and routine export controls in 1972, 1974, and 1976.16
The Trading With the Enemy Act is currently the legal authority for a number
of government activities. It provides the basis for current trade embargoes
against North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Cuba.77 It is the legal authority
for our government to continue to block (hold) the assets of a number of Eastern
European citizens, property which was seized during World War II and vested in
the name of the United States Office of Alien Property.78 Today, the Department
of the Treasury manages millions of dollars of such blocked assets. They currently
have control of more than $80 million of assets of the People's Republic of China
alone. 79 The Department of the Treasury was an avid supporter of exempting
the Trading With the Enemy Act from the provisions of the National Emergencies
Act. The Treasury Department's argument was that, although the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the taking of property without due
process of law, including just compensation, the Trading With the Enemy Act
permits such action with respect to foreign property during a national emergency.
As a Treasury Department official testified before the Special Committee,
[C] onstitutional problems might arise with respect to the validity for
continued blocking of assets of foreign countries if all national
emergencies or authorities thereunder were terminated.
The problem is the protection of the fifth amendment against the taking
of property without due process of law, including proper compensation.
However, the situation is different with regard to the blocking of property
in time of emergency . . . And the point, in short, is if blocking were
attempted under any other authority or any other theory of law than the
existence of an emergency, blocking might prove to be ineffectual
constitutionally. (Emphasis added.)8o
Thus, the Treasury Department reasoning is that we need the legal fiction of a
national emergency to get around the mandates of the Constitution.
In all fairness, the Treasury Department does face a real dilemma in deciding
what to do with the blocked assets. One alternative is for the Department to
return the assets to the foreign owners without considering whether the foreign
governments will return United States citizens' assets which they have blocked.
This alternative solves the constitutional problem of taking property without due
process, and was urged at the conclusion of an extensive investigation into the
administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act in 1957. "Confiscation must
not be the practice of a nation which encourages morality in others. Confiscation
is the practice of people who deny that morality exists."8' This approach, however,
fails to recognize the "bargaining position " argumen t, i.e., the benefit gained
from blocking a foreign country's assets until that countr agrees to release
blocked American assets. 82
The second alternative is to permanently vest the property - not just block it
- and use it to pay American citizens for losses suffered abroad. This action,
however, would clearly recognize the act of confiscation and might destrox any
chance of future property settlement with these foreign governments.83
The last alternative, and the one the Treasury Department has chosen, is to
continue blocking the assets hoping it will strengthen their hand in any future
property settlements. The major drawback to the continued holding of the assets
seems to be their dissipation over time. A 1953 investigation into the
administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act revealed that the Office of
Alien Property was authorized to defray its expenses out of the proceeds of vested
property.8 The study also recommended an investigation into "persons,
manipulations, malfeasance, and misfeasance, of political preference in
appointments to lucrative job holdings"u within the Office of Alien Property.
One also has to ask what the real difference is between the blocking of assets for
an indefinite period and outright confiscation. In 1976, Congressman Bingham
of New York held hearings 6 to review the current status of the Trading With
the Enemy Act. The House considered three bills, 7 resulting in legislation passed
by Congress and signed by the President into law at the end of 1977.88
Unfortunately, the other exceptions from the provisions of the National
Emergencies Act have not received such detailed attention. Section 502(b) of the
National Emergencies Act requires that each committee of the House and Senate
having jurisdiction with respect to any of the statutes excepted from the provisions
of the Act "shall make a complete study and investigation concerning that
provision of law and make a report, including any recommendations and proposed
revisions such committee may have to its respective House of Congress within
two hundred and seventy days." 89 Correspondence between the author and
Senator Mathias's office indicates that the required follow-up reports with the
exception of the Trading With the Enemy Act report by Congressman Bingham's
House subcommittee,90 have not been prepared. Perhaps the understandable
confusion over which committee is responsible for what report is the reason for
their unavailability. The only hint of the proper committee jurisdiction is found
in the back of the Special Committee compilation of Emergency Power
Statutes. 9 '
The authorities given government agencies in the statutes exempted from the
provisions of the National Emergencies Act are broad authorities - meant only
for use in time of real emergency conditions. An agency's ability to lease property
without a cost ceiling,92 to procure property and services without advertising,93
and to enter into defense related contracts without restriction9 are large grants
of discretionary power to the Executive. In these areas, day-to-day administrative
actions will continue to rest on a legal foundation of national emergency.
An examination of some of the agencies' argument for this discretionary
power based upon a fictional national emergency is interesting. During House
hearings the General Services Administration argued for their continued
release from price restrictions when acquiring a leasehold interest in property in
this manner:
We had a fire which started to burn up a substantial quantity of
personnel records of the Federal Government, and but for the emergency
CZC)
leasing authority which permitted us to move the records quickly into a
facility that was not subject to being demolished, we might have lost
more of the records. There really was an emergency in that case and it
did not relate to Korea. However, it was a very present thing.95
No doubt the General Services Administration's ability to quickly find a new
fireproof facility in this case was highly desirable. But the question is whether
this ability should have been based upon a national emergency statute triggered
by President Truman's proclamation of national emergency in 1950 as it was.
During the same hearings the General Services Administration argued for
their continued ability to negotiate contracts without advertising, saying that it
allowed them to award contracts to small businesses, to labor surplus areas, and
to others who will help the U.S. balance of payments. 6 Surely the potential for
abuse is evident and the inability of the Congress to provide statutory guidelines
to allow the pursuit of desired social policies without giving the G.S.A.
emergency discretion is not at all clear.
No doubt the wish to aid small business, to help the unemployed by awarding
contracts in labor surplus areas, and the correction of our balance of payments
deficit are all legitimate goals. The question is whether the pursuit of these goals
should rest on a legal fiction of national emergency. A General Services
Administration official admitted that:
We have felt for many years that some kind of permanent legislation for
these purposes would be a better arrangement.97
The Department of Defense uses this same reasoning. As one official stated,
"The procurement process within the armed services is utilized to accomplish
certain major social and economic policies by the placement of contracts in labor
surplus areas and in disaster areas, by letting contracts to favor small business,
and to achieve a balance of payments favorable to the United States." 98
One exception from the provisions of the National Emergencies Act has
especially broad wording:
The President may authorize any department or agency of the
Government which exercises functions in connection with the national
defense, . . . to enter into contracts or into amendments or modifications
of contracts heretofore or hereafter made and to make advance payments
thereon, without regard to other provisions of law relating to the making,
performance, amendment, or modification of contracts, whenever he
deems that such action would facilitate the national defense.
This chapter shall be effective only during a national emergency.99
The Department of Defense explains,
This statute provides authority to correct mistakes in contracts, to
formalize informal commitments, to indemnity contractors against losses
or claims resulting from unusually hazardous risks to which they might
be exposed during the performance of a contract and for which insurance,
even if available, would be prohibitively expensive, and to grant other
extraordinary contractual relief. 00
Again, there is no doubt that the Department of Defense needs the
flexibility to modify contracts in certain instances and to indemnify contractors
where commercial insurance is not feasible. The question is whether such
flexibility should be based upon hastily drafted emergency powers designed as
temporary measures or upon legislation drafted with normal process, intended
for normal times and designed for permanent use.
The last statute exempted from the provisions of National Emergencies Act
suspends certain limitations on the number of officers in the Armed Forces.'0 '
This statute has been used, among other things, to authorize the suspension of
otherwise mandatory separation of 913 members of the Armed Forces who are
listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia until they return or are accounted
for.'0 2 Few would advocate that these brave men should be separated from the
Armed Forces, but why can't Congress deal with the problem through ordinary
legislative channels? Surely all of the real parties in interest would benefit from
legislative resolution of this tragically persistent problem.
To summarize, the emergency statutory authorities delegated to the executive
branch contained in the eight exemptions from the provisions of the National
Emergencies Act have some common characteristics. First, the original legislative
intent reveals that the authority was only to be valid in time of a declared national
emergency. Second, a legal (as opposed to a real) national emergency presently
exists and is the trigger to make the authority available to the Executive on a
continuous basis. Finally, the extraordinary authority is defended in terms of the
need for internal flexibility or the need to accomplish social policies unrelated to
any condition of real emergency. Why Congress shouldn't deal with these
exceptions through permanent, non-emergency legislation is simply an
unanswered question. In any event Congress might have, at least, required the
Executive agencies to report actions taken under the exempted statutes; but even
this is not required.
THE CASE LAW
During the first round of hearings conducted by the Special Committee in
1973, Dr. Gerhard Casper, of the University of Chicago, testified that " [t] he
courts are of little use in the emergency area because the courts are often
unwilling, and perhaps rightly unwilling to second guess the Executive ... on
political evaluations."s03 What Dr. Casper was referring to is that even when a
presidentially declared national emergency remains unterminated years after the
conditions which gave rise to the declaration have passed, the courts have
consistently refused to second guess the Executive's argument that a national
emergency still exists. The courts, almost without exception, have affirmed the
Executive's reliance on past declarations of national emergency to trigger their
current use of emergency authority. In the words of a Treasury Department
official, " [y] ou do not have to have a state of hostility or imminent hostilities in
effect. What you need is a legal emergency on the books. The courts are not going
to look behind that . .. "104 Although courts have often refused to touch these
types of "political questions," i.e., those questions the courts feel can be better
determined by another branch of government, one might have expected some
standard of reasonableness to be injected by the judiciary which would limit the
time the Executive could rely on a past declaration of national emergency.0 5
Why, for example, has the judiciary so consistently accepted the Executive's
argument that President Truman's 1950 declaration of national emergency can
continue to trigger the use of national emergency authority almost thirty years
later? Shouldn't the courts limit the Executive's reliance on the 1950 declaration
to a reasonable time after the conditions which gave rise to the declaration have
passed? Ideally, the Executive would terminate its own declarations of national
emergency when the emergency conditions no longer exist. But failing that,
shouldn't the courts refuse to enforce Executive actions based on outdated
declarations of national emergency? No doubt the courts should be wary of
interfering in the Executive's province but it appears that a judicial check on the
Executive's unreasonable use of a fiction to gain extraordinary authority is
warranted.o106
Only one case has been found where there was an outright rejection of the
1950 Korean Proclamation reasoning. The defendant was charged with violating
gold regulations based upon the emergency provision of the Trading With the
Enemy Act. A California District Court, in 1962, dismissed the indictment saying
that "if the President can create crimes by fiat and without congressional approval,
our system is not much different from that of the Communists, which allegedly
threatens our existence. 107 The case, however, was overruled three years later.108
In 1972, Justice Douglas gave a hint that he might favor judicial intervention.
Title 18, Section 2153(a) of the United States Code makes it a crime to destroy or
attempt to destroy any war material, war premises, or war utilities in times of war
or national emergency. Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari
on a lower court conviction'09 under this statute, saying,
I doubt that many lawyers, let alone laymen, of ordinary intelligence are
aware of the continuing effect of the 1950 national emergency declaration.
Under these circumstances, it is questionable whether proper notice of
possible criminal liability has been afforded to any individual prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. 2153(a). The viability of criminal responsibility
predicated upon evaluations of current political temperament or outdated
presidential proclamations is an important issue worthy of our
consideration on the merits." 0
On the other hand, examples of judicial affirmation of the Executive's use of
the national emergency fiction abound. The validity of the Treasury Department's
Foreign Assets Control Regulations"' is continuously upheld based upon a
national emergency provision of the Trading With the Enemy Act triggered by
the 1950 Korean declaration." 2
Similar reasoning has been used to sustain the deportation of an alien without
a hearing"3 and to sustain the deportation of an alien for remaining outside the
United States to avoid training in the Armed Forces in time of a national
emergency."i4 One court in 1955" used the Korean declaration to uphold a
conviction for engaging in financial transactions with Communist China, as did
two recent cases which upheld decisions by the Commissioner of Customs to
detain incoming packages originating in North Vietnam." 6
In 1947, the Navy leased an airfield in Illinois to a private operator with the
following provision:
It is understood and agreed that this lease will at all times be revocable
at will by the Government upon presentation of notice of cancellation to
the Lessee, in writing, sixty (60) days prior to such termination, . ..
in event of a national emergency and a decision by the Secretary of the
Navy that such revocation is essential." 7
When the Army wanted the field for a Nike (missle) site in 1954, the Navy
revoked the lease stating "that a national emergency declared by the President
in 1950 was still in effect." The United States Supreme Court upheld the Naxy's
reasoning."I18
In a 1973 case, the United States Court of Appeals, in dicta, approved of the
use of the 1950 Korean resolution to support the Secretary of Commerce's ability
to requisition private ships under 46 U.S.C. 1242."9
Whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national
defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by
proclamation of the President, it shall be lawful for the Commission
(Secretary of Commerce) to requisition or purchase any vessel or other
watercraft owned by citizens of the United States.
The 1950 Korean Proclamation also seems to affect our reserve fleet legislation.120
In justifying their practice of not questioning a Presidential proclamation of
emergency, some judges take cognizance of the current world situation. This
practice, however, tends to confuse the distinction between a real and merely a
legal (fictional) emergency. In affirming the decision of the Secretary of State
not to validate plaintiff's passport for travel to Cuba, a United States Discrict
Court said,
Plaintiffs seek to undermine the authority for the Secretary's regulation
by urging that the national emergency was limited in scope and has not
endured in time, because it dealt with the Korean War. Although the
Korean fighting precipitated the 1950 Proclamation, it was clear even
then that Korea could not be treated as an isolated trouble spot. To limit
the emergency proclamation to Korea would be to ignore its finding of a
threat of 'world conquest by communist imperialism' based on 'recent
events in Korea and elsewhere,' and to require a new presidential
proclamation for each new crisis in the continuing chain of world-
wide eruptions.121
Judge Friendly, in affirming the Treasury Department's decision to block a
Cuban citizen's right to the proceeds of his son's life insurance policy, stated that
"while the courts will not review a determination so peculiarly within the province
of the chief executive, there can hardly be doubt as to the existence of an
emergency today when thousands of United States troops are in action and many
more are in readiness around the globe."1 22
SOME WORK REMAINS
When the Special Committee disbanded in 1976, they left a list of "issues
that will also deserve attention in the future."' 23 The list revealed the perceived
need for Congressional review of the statutes exempted from the provisions of
the National Emergencies Act. As previously discussed, the Trading With the
Enemy Act has received thorough attention which has resulted in legislation. 2 4
Hopefully, the other exceptions will be given careful consideration as well.
The Special Committee also called for careful review of Executive department
requests for permanent law replacing expiring emergency authority in order to
preserve the distinction between permanent and emergency laws. Perhaps the
Special Committee was referring to the need to be attentive to the type of
argument advanced by the Department of Defense in 1975.
World and national conditions have changed since President Truman
officially proclaimed the state of national emergency in 1950 incident to
the commencement of hostilities in Korea. Many authorities which were
used then for the first time were regarded as extraordinary. Since then,
experience has demonstrated a need for these authorities in the regular
conduct of the day-to-day operations of the Department of Defense.S
In 1970, the acting Assistant Secretary of State was quoted as saying, "We
believe the said authority made available by virtue of the 1950 proclamation has
been needed during the past two decades and is still needed. This continuing
need results from the very acts and threats of aggression which the U.S. and its
allies have faced since 1950."126
Dr. Adrian Fisher says that the above remark is "a perfect illustration of the
kind of danger which exists in a Government like ours when you have loaded guns
lying around. They may have been originally loaded in order to fire a salute, but
end up being charged with shot and used for other business."1 27
CONCLUSION
The National Emergencies Act will do much to end emergency government.
On September 14, 1978, we will be closer to normal constitutional government
than we have been at any time since 1933. The power of the President to declare
new emergencies and employ extraordinary powers has been made subject to
Congressional approval and public scrutiny. Nevertheless, there remain important
questions about the future of this legislation. First, will there be a constitutional
problem with section 202(a) (1), the provision for termination of Presidentally
declared emergencies by concurrent resolution of the Congress? Second, will
Congress or the President ever terminate the four current emergencies? Finally,
will the Congress follow through? The excepted statutes are an obvious anomaly,
but the hard feelings of the Vietnam and Watergate eras have eased and all the
political reasons for these exceptions and the simple inertia which has previously
characterized this area will be significant obstacles to action toward repealing
these exceptions and replacing them, where necessary, with permanent legislation.
Certainly the action already taken on the Trading With the Enemy Act is a hopeful
sign. The Congress, the courts and the President will all need to adjust to the
changes wrought by this Act and, although the immediate impact is small for
most citizens, it will substantially affect us all during the next several years
as we move out of emergency government and toward constitutional government.
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